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What Are the Odds? 
Option-Based Forecasts of FOMC Target Changes 
William R. Emmons, Aeimit K. Lakdawala, and Christopher J. Neely
FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES
OPTIONS
The Chicago Board of Trade has offered futures
contracts written on the federal funds rate since
1988. For more than a decade, trading volumes
in these contracts remained miniscule in compari-
son with other interest rate futures contracts, such
as 3-month eurodollar and long-term Treasury
securities. Researchers nonetheless have found
that federal funds futures contracts provide useful
information about market expectations of short-
term interest rate movements (Poole, Rasche, and
Thornton, 2002; Sack, 2004; and Piazzesi and
Swanson, 2005).
For reasons that are not well understood,
trading volumes in the federal funds futures con-
tracts increased dramatically after 2000.1 This led
to the introduction, in 2003, of exchange-traded
O
ptions on federal funds futures
contracts provide information
about market expectations of
Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) monetary policy actions above and
beyond that provided by federal funds futures
contracts alone. In particular, options provide
important information about the dispersion and
skewness of market expectations. Under some
assumptions, option prices imply a complete
probability density function (PDF) over possible
FOMC target-rate choices.
This article uses the method of Carlson, Craig,
and Melick (2005) to extract an implied risk-
neutral probability density function over possible
future federal funds target rates from daily option
prices. Option-based forecasts are most useful
when more than two federal funds target outcomes
are plausible at an upcoming FOMC meeting. If
only one or two meeting outcomes are plausible,
a futures-based forecast is simpler and more
appropriate.
This article uses probability forecasts derived from options to assess evolving market uncertainty
about Federal Reserve monetary policy actions in a variety of recent events and episodes. Options
on federal funds futures contracts reveal a complete probability density function over possible
Federal Reserve target rates, thus augmenting the expectations provided by federal funds futures
contracts. Option-based forecasts are most useful when more than two federal funds target outcomes
are plausible at an upcoming policy meeting. (JEL E47, E52, G13)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2006, 88(6), pp. 543-61.
1 See Carlson, Craig, and Melick (2005) for a more extensive discus-
sion of federal funds futures options contracts and market conven-
tions. The Chicago Board of Trade provides contract specifications
and current market prices for both federal funds futures and futures
options at
www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1525+14453,00.html.
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             options contracts written on federal funds futures
contracts. A federal funds futures call option, for
example, gives the buyer the right, but not the
obligation, to obtain a long position in the refer-
enced federal funds futures contract at a pre-
specified price. The options are American-style
(i.e., they can be exercised at any time up to or at
maturity) and are settled in cash rather than by
actual delivery of the futures contract. Trading
volume in federal funds futures options has varied
considerably over time, but substantial amounts
of open interest have been observed in some con-
tracts. The first boxed insert, on the federal funds
futures and options-on-futures markets, reviews
the specifications of those derivative contracts.
Finance theory long has recognized that a
rich set of option contracts written on any under-
lying financial instrument or economic variable,
such as an interest rate (or interest rate futures
contract), can provide a great deal of informa-
tion beyond simple expectations of a future price.
In particular, option prices reveal how much
investors are willing to pay for a chance to profit
from an “extreme” future movement in the spot
price of the reference instrument, either up or
down. Therefore, option prices can potentially tell
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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THE FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES AND OPTIONS-ON-FUTURES MARKETS
The 30-day federal fund futures contract is an interest rate derivative, which has been traded
on the Chicago Board of Trade since October 3, 1988. The volume of trading on federal funds has
grown dramatically since the market’s inception, reaching almost 6.3 million contracts traded in
2002. Prices on the federal funds futures markets are quoted as 100 minus the average daily federal
funds overnight rate for the delivery month. That is, a price quote of 96.1 implies an average daily
interest rate of (100 – 96.1 =) 3.9 percent for the delivery month.
Contracts are settled in cash, at 2:00 p.m. central time, on the last trading day of the month.
The final settlement price for the contract is the average daily federal funds overnight rate for the
delivery month, as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The average is calculated
over calendar days. The notional contract size is $5 million, which means that a rise in the contract
price of 1 basis point nets (costs) a holder of a long (short) position $41.67. The $41.67 is the increase
in the interest earned from a 1-basis-point rise in interest rates on a deposit held for 30 days, using
a day count of 360 days per year (41.67 = 5,000,000 * 0.0001 * 30/360). The minimum quote size
is one-half of 1 basis point.
The Chicago Board of Trade has sponsored trading American options on federal funds futures
contracts since March 14, 2003.1 Strike prices are created every 6.25 basis points. The asset under-
lying the options contract is one federal funds futures contract. Option premia are quoted in basis
points and the minimum tick size is one-quarter of 1 basis point or $10.4175. Options contracts
trade until the last business day of the delivery month.
Because other short-term interest rates closely track the federal funds rate, federal funds futures
can be used to hedge general short-term interest rate risk and/or speculate on future short-term
interest rates. And the design of the options on federal funds futures permits speculators to invest
based on detailed views on the likely path of the future funds rate. Therefore a variety of users
find federal funds futures and options on federal funds futures to be useful. Users of options on
federal funds futures include issuers of commercial paper, portfolio managers, dealers in govern-
ment securities, hedge fund managers, and even foreign exchange dealers.
1 American options can be exercised any time until expiry; European options can be exercised only at expiry.us about investors’ expectations, including how
likely “extreme” movements are thought to be.
Changes in estimated probability density
functions over time illuminate how market uncer-
tainty about Federal Reserve monetary policy
intentions or actions evolved during significant
episodes or events during the period June 2003
through April 2006.2 The events we study are as
follows:
• A pre-commitment to extended policy
accommodation: In August 2003, the
Federal Reserve publicly committed itself
to maintaining monetary policy accommo-
dation for a “considerable period.”
• A signal of an impending target change: In
May 2004, the Federal Reserve signaled that
its first target-rate increase in four years was
forthcoming.
• A pre-commitment to gradual removal of
policy accommodation: Beginning in June
2004, the Federal Reserve publicly commit-
ted itself to a policy of raising the federal
funds target rate at a “measured pace.”
• Devastating hurricanes: In August and
September 2005, a series of hurricanes
devastated parts of the U.S. Gulf Coast,
creating uncertainty about their economic
impacts and the Federal Reserve’s likely
response.
• Congressional testimony and public commu-
nication: Reports of Chairman Bernanke’s
April 2006 testimony before the Joint
Economic Committee whipsawed financial
markets.
In each case, we study the federal funds
futures option–implied probabilities assigned by
market participants to possible Federal Reserve
target-rate choices at upcoming meetings. In the
first and third cases listed above, our data allow
us to evaluate the (evolving) credibility of Federal
Reserve commitments to future actions. The sec-
ond and fourth cases are examples of market
uncertainty about both economic fundamentals
and the Federal Reserve’s likely reactions to these
fundamentals. Finally, the last case clearly illus-
trates pronounced market reactions to Federal
Reserve communication efforts.
The remainder of the article is organized as
follows. The next section briefly discusses federal
funds futures contracts as market-based indicators
of expected monetary policy actions. Then, we
describe option contracts on federal funds futures
and explain how one can extract probability den-
sity functions over future Federal Reserve target-
rate choices from such option prices. Finally, we
use daily option-derived risk-neutral probability
density functions to explore the evolution of
market uncertainty about future interest rates




Figure 1 displays the implied federal funds
rate from the futures contract closest to expiration
(heavy black line), as well as the implied average
rate on every third federal funds rate futures con-
tract traded between May 1, 2003, and February 9,
2006 (all other lines). Several futures contracts
trade on any given day, each written on a different
future month. For example, 12 different futures
contracts traded on December 2, 2005—one
referring to each month from December 2005
through November 2006. Figure 1 shows only
those from December 2005 and March, June, and
September 2006.
The final settlement price on each month’s
contract depends on the average effective daily
federal funds rate during that contract month.
That is, the December 2005 settlement price was
95.84, calculated as 100 minus the 30-day average
of actual effective federal funds rates observed
during December 2005, which was 4.16 percent.
As each contract trades over time—until settle-
ment on the first business day after the end of
the contract month—the market price converges
toward the final settlement price. The figure illus-
trates that the volatility of futures prices varies
over time, indicating that uncertainty about future
interest rates likewise varies. Note that, while
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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2 In related research, Neely (2005) relates surprises in federal funds
target changes to large changes in the implied volatility of 3-month
eurodollar rates. uncertainty (volatility) about a particular contract’s
settlement price decreases over time, the decline
in uncertainty is not monotonic.
Federal funds futures contracts usefully gauge
market expectations about future FOMC monetary
policy actions, although there are more sophisti-
cated approaches to forecasting rate changes and
levels (e.g., Sarno, Thornton, and Valente, 2005).
There is some evidence that econometric models
may improve on the implied forecasts from futures
prices, particularly at long horizons, where risk
premia might be larger and futures trading volume
is much lower.
Expected federal funds targets derived from
federal funds futures contracts represent only the
central tendency (the mean) of market expecta-
tions, not the dispersion of expectations about
potential outcomes. Dispersion of expectations
increases with the forecast horizon. The next
section explains how options on short-dated
money-market instruments inform us about
expected volatility (uncertainty), the direction
of risks (asymmetry), and the relative probability
of extreme events (kurtosis). One can interpret
the dispersion of expectations as measuring the
public’s uncertainty about monetary policy.
OPTIONS ON FEDERAL FUNDS
FUTURES CONTRACTS
Option contracts written on federal funds
futures contracts provide a tool to measure (and
speculate on) the uncertainty among market par-
ticipants about future monetary policy actions.
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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Daily Federal Funds Target Rate and Futures-Implied Yields Between May 1, 2003, and February
9, 2006
NOTE: The thick black line is the implied federal funds rate from the contract closest to expiration. The other lines represent implied
yields from daily settlement of federal funds futures contracts traded between May 1, 2003, and February 9, 2006.The Bank of England has used the information
contained in option prices for informational pur-
poses for some time, and other central banks may
follow.
There is a large academic literature that uses
market data to forecast interest rates. Recent exam-
ples using data from the federal funds futures
market to forecast future Federal Reserve policy
actions include Poole, Rasche, and Thornton
(2002), Sack (2004), and Piazzesi and Swanson
(2005). Another strand of the literature investigates
the use of options on interest rate futures contracts
to assess market expectations of future short-term
interest rates. Papers investigating option-based
forecasts include Abken (1995), Soderlind and
Svensson (1997), Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002),
Andersen and Wagener (2002), Hordahl and Vestin
(2005), and Carlson, Craig, and Melick (2005).
This article builds on the option-based forecasting
research pioneered in these papers.
How Liquid Are Federal Funds Futures
and Futures Options?
Although one would like to estimate expecta-
tions of federal funds rate targets for the indefinite
future, futures and futures-option contracts do not
have sufficient liquidity to derive expectations
more than a few months ahead. Figure 2 shows
trading volume and open interest (log scale, by
forecast horizon) for futures and options on futures
for trading days in November 2005. The greatest
trading volume occurs in options on futures con-
tracts expiring 1 to 3 months in the future; there
is still non-negligible volume in options 4 to 5
months ahead and practically no volume more
than 6 months ahead. The open interest charts
tell a similar story. Open interest falls off from 3 to
4 months and then to very low levels at 6 months.
Thus, futures and options on futures may not
be very informative at long horizons. Note, how-
ever, that the trading volume and open interest
in options—which include all strike prices—are
much greater than that in the underlying futures
contract. Fluctuations in trading volume over
longer periods appear to indicate that trading
increases during turbulent periods, precisely
when information is most needed.
Probability Densities Over the Federal
Funds Target Rate
The payoffs to options on federal funds
futures depend only on the average federal funds
rate over the contract expiration month. Therefore,
the price of the option provides some informa-
tion on the likelihood of various outcomes. For
example, if the price of a given call option rises,
then—all else equal—the market expects a greater
probability of a higher final settlement price (a
lower interest rate).
To translate option prices into risk-neutral
probabilities of specific outcomes, however, one
must make some assumption about the risk pre-
mia that investors require (or are willing to pay)
to take certain risks. Carlson, Craig, and Melick
(2005) compare the task of obtaining probabilities
from option prices to estimating the probability
of a fire from the price of fire insurance. If fire
insurance companies demand a risk premium to
insure houses, then one must know this premium
to accurately estimate the probability of a fire from
the price of insurance and the firm’s contingent
liability.
Similarly, to infer the probability density
function over possible federal funds target rates
from option prices, one must make some assump-
tions about risk premia embedded in federal funds
futures prices. One hypothesis is that the marginal
investors (buyers and sellers) are risk-neutral (i.e.,
that observed prices are actuarially fair). However,
Hordahl and Vestin (2005), among others, find
evidence of important differences between risk-
neutral and objective (i.e., realized) probability
distributions in bond prices.
In general, it is not clear whether these dis-
crepancies represent risk premia in the economic
sense of compensation for risk. Piazzesi and
Swanson (2005) document substantial prediction
biases in federal funds futures prices and label
them risk premia. Table 1, excerpted from Piazzesi
and Swanson (2005), shows the estimates of the
difference between futures-rate predictions and
realized interest rates n months ahead. The esti-
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n is the n-period-ahead interest rate
implied by the federal funds futures price in
month t and rt+n is the actual (realized, ex post)
average funds rate in month t+n, to which the
federal funds futures price should converge. Thus,
the value of α(n) in the table corresponding to the
1-month horizon (3.4) indicates that the futures-
implied forecast of the interest rate exceeds the
realized 1-month-ahead interest rate by 3.4 basis
points, on average.
Table 1 indicates that the forecasted federal
funds rate exceeds the actual rate by 3 to 6 basis
points per month of the forecast horizon. At a 6-
month horizon, Piazzesi and Swanson estimate a
73-basis-point risk premium on an annualized
basis. This appears implausibly large to Carlson,
Craig, and Melick (2005), who point out that one
observes only a prediction bias; its meaning is
unclear. For this reason, they assume no risk
premium at all.
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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Figure 2
Trading Volumes and Open Interest on Federal Funds Futures and Futures Options During
November 2005
NOTE: The figure displays open interest (lower panels) and trading volumes (upper panels) from federal funds futures contracts (right
panel) and option contracts (left panel) in November 2005. The vertical scales for the lower panels are in logarithmic form.Although we are uncertain about the existence
and magnitude of risk premia in futures prices,
we think that it is reasonable to assume that the
prediction bias is 1 basis point per month in the
empirical work that follows. For our purposes in
illustrating broad movements of market expecta-
tions over time, the precise nature of our risk-
premium assumption is not critical. The second
boxed insert, on risk premia versus term premia,
discusses whether one should interpret any
observed prediction bias in the federal funds
futures market as a term premium, a common
interpretation of a risk premium in fixed-income
markets.
In addition to a risk premium in the level of
the futures price, there might be significant risk
premia associated with exposure to option-price
changes caused by changing volatility. Such pre-
mia are more difficult to estimate, although some
researchers have begun to do so. Nevertheless,
even in the presence of constant but unknown
risk premia, changes in estimated PDFs still
presumably tell us about changes in the true,
physical density.
Estimating Federal Funds Target
Probability Densities
Densities for asset prices (or interest rates)
have been derived under a variety of assumptions
about the functional form of the distribution. For
asset prices that take continuous values, such as
equities or foreign exchange, estimating densities
quickly becomes very complicated and technical.
Fortunately, the fact that the federal funds target
rate historically has taken on a discrete set of
values—in multiples of 25 basis points since
1989—greatly simplifies its estimation.
Consider a scenario in which the Fed is certain
to choose from only three possible target rates,
{T1, T2, and T3}. Each of these three targets implies
a unique average federal funds rate {FT,1, FT,2, and
FT,3} for the month of the FOMC meeting if the
target is known to change only on the date of the
FOMC meeting, day N. Given an initial value for
the federal funds target at the start of the month,
T0, and a given target, T1 (set at the FOMC meet-
ing), one can solve for the average federal funds
rate, FT,1, that T1 implies, as follows:
(2)
If three options, with strike prices X1, X2, and
X3, are actively traded on a given day, where X1
is the strike on a call and X2 and X3 are the strikes
on puts, then the probability of the selection of
each target can be estimated using the following
regression:
(3)
where the variables on the left-hand side are the
riskless values of the current option prices at
expiry and the explanatory variables are the pay-
offs to the options under the three states of the
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Table 1
Piazzesi and Swanson (2005) Estimates of Federal Funds Futures Risk Premia 
n 1 23456
α(n) 3.4 7.4 12.5 19.2 27.6 36.7
(t-statistic) (3.9) (3.6) (3.2) (3.2) (3.2) (3.1)
Annualized 41.2 44.6 49.9 57.6 66.3 73.4
NOTE: The table is excerpted from Piazzesi and Swanson (2005). The table shows results from regressing the difference between the
implied average federal funds rate, n months ahead, on the realized federal funds rate for that month, from 1988:10 to 2003:12:
ft
n – rt+n = α(n) + ε (n)
t+n. Standard errors are heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent; t-statistics from those standard errors are in
parentheses; α(n) is measured in basis points.world (possible FOMC target-rate choices).3 The
coefficients {π1, π2, π3} are the probabilities that
set the expected payoffs of the options (right-hand
side) equal to the values of the options at expiry.
Probabilities of specific targets on FOMC meeting
dates can be calculated from probabilities of the
average funds rates over a month, as in (2). 
Carlson, Craig, and Melick (2005) discuss in
detail how the system can be estimated by ordi-
nary least squares, imposing equality restrictions
such as π1 + π2 + π3 = 1. Alternatively, one can
numerically maximize the likelihood function,
under some assumption about the distribution of
the error terms. Estimation by maximum likeli-
hood permits more elaborate constraints, such as
positive probabilities or requiring the probabilities
to be consistent with the futures-implied rate.
As discussed earlier, Piazzesi and Swanson
(2005) showed that, on average, federal funds
futures prices have implied interest rates that
exceeded the actual realized federal funds rate.
To adjust for this bias, the estimated probabilities
can be constrained to imply a risk-adjusted target.
However, because Piazzesi and Swanson’s (2005)
estimate of the risk premia may be too large, we
adjust the federal funds futures–implied rate
downward by 1 basis point for each month of
the forecast horizon.
How should one interpret the error terms?
The error terms result from market frictions such
as (i) bid-ask spreads in both the option and the
underlying asset, (ii) imperfect liquidity, and (iii)
approximations in formulating the model, such
as incorrect market risk premia, imposition of zero
probabilities to unlikely actions, and ignoring the
possibility of early exercise. In the absence of such
approximations and frictions, the probabilities
would be estimated exactly and the estimation
would be an inversion of prices to probabilities.
The facts that the errors are small and the proba-
bilities are precisely estimated indicate that the
approximations are probably reasonable and the
frictions unimportant.
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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3 Notice that this estimation method assumes (counterfactually)
that the options are European—that is, that they can be exercised
only at maturity. The discrepancy introduced by this assumption
is likely to be small, as the amount of early exercise of federal
funds options is very small.
RISK PREMIA VERSUS TERM PREMIA IN THE 
FEDERAL FUNDS FUTURES MARKET
Futures prices of non-storable commodities embody only market expectations of future supply
and demand conditions. Non-storable commodities are perishables—things that cannot be set
aside and carried into future periods. Fresh eggs, for example, are non-storable because they spoil
quickly and cannot be frozen or otherwise preserved.
Federal funds futures prices reflect the value today of a future claim on deposit balances at
the Federal Reserve (reserves). Reserves are non-storable because a bank cannot hold reserves today
to satisfy future reserve requirements. Thus, today’s federal funds futures prices reflect market
expectations of future reserve-market conditions. In other words, they are an indicator of future
Federal Reserve monetary policy actions.
There could be a market-risk or liquidity premium associated with trading of federal funds
futures contracts because their expected returns co-vary with other returns and because this market
is not perfectly liquid. However, any such premium should not be thought of as a traditional term
premium. Because every future period’s reserve-market conditions are independent of all previous
period’s conditions—that is, there is no possible riskless arbitrage between them—we would not
expect any systematic relationship between a futures price and the contract’s term to maturity
(i.e., a term premium).Let’s consider a concrete example. After the
June 25, 2003, FOMC meeting, the federal funds
target rate stood unchanged at 1 percent. What
probabilities did the option market assign to vari-
ous outcomes at the August 12, 2003, FOMC meet-
ing? There were 13 options (seven calls and six
puts) with eight different strike prices on June 25.
The five possible targets that the Fed was likely
to choose from were 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, and 1.5.
The following system is estimated by maximum
likelihood: 
(4)
where εt is a 13-by-1 vector of normally distributed
errors.
It is instructive to see how one transforms the
market data to the data in (4). The first variable
on the left-hand side (0.00250) is the price of the
first call option, with a strike price of 99.3125,
evaluated at the expiration date of the option, in
about 3 months (er(T–t)C(t, T, X1, Ft)), at an interest
rate of 0.925 percent. The variable in the first row,
first column, on the right-hand side is the payoff
to a call option with a strike of 99.3125, assuming
that the FOMC chooses a target rate of 0.5 percent
on August 12. A target of 1.0 percent prior to
August 12, combined with a move to 0.5 percent
on August 12, would produce an average target
rate of 0.6774 (= 1 * 11/31 + 0.5 * 20/31) during
August, which translates into a final settlement
price on the futures contract of (100 – 0.6774 =)
99.3226. If that 0.5 percent target were chosen, a
call option with a strike of 99.3125 would be worth
(99.3226 – 99.3125 =) 0.0101, using the formula
max(0,FT,1 – X1). Similarly, if one looks at the first
row, second column, which assumes that the







































































































































































































the final settlement price for the futures contract
would be 99.1613 (= 100 – 1.0 * 11/31 – 0.75 *
20/31) and so a call option with a strike of 99.3125
would be worthless. That is, the term in the first
row, second column of the right-hand side is 0.
Each column of the regressor matrix is associated
with a unique FOMC target, and each row is
associated with a unique option.
Estimating this system, subject to the follow-
ing constraints that the probabilities are positive
and sum to 1 and that the mean of the PDF equals
the term premium–adjusted futures price, pro-
duces the following coefficients for the five ele-
ments of the π vector: π = {0.114, 0.188, 0.697, 0, 0}.
The standard errors for the estimated probabilities
range from almost zero to 0.015.
The estimation constrains the probabilities
to generate the interest rate implied by the futures
price, adjusted for risk. In the example, the futures
price for August was 99.045, which implied an
interest rate of 0.955 percent for August. Adjusting
this implied interest rate for the 67-day forecast
horizon—June 25 through August 31—and assum-
ing 1 basis point every 30 days, one obtains a risk-
adjusted implied rate for August of (0.955 – (67/30)
*0.01 =) 0.9327. When numerically optimizing the
likelihood function to calculate probabilities, one
can force the implied interest rate to equal this
risk-adjusted interest rate. In the present example,
one can verify that the estimated probabilities
imply a federal funds rate for August of 0.9327
percent.4
To informally assess the importance of the
constraints—the fit of the model—one can esti-
mate the unconstrained model to see whether
the results are sensitive to the imposition of the
constraints. If the results are highly sensitive, it
might suggest that the model doesn’t fit the data
well and the probabilities are not reliable. Reassur-
ingly, the unconstrained system produces a
plausible and roughly similar probability vector
of π = {0.050, 0.226, 0.686, 0.023, 0.013}, whose
standard errors are of similar magnitudes to those
from the constrained system.
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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4 The federal funds rates implied by the five targets (0.5 to 1.5 
percent) are 0.6774, 0.8387, 1, 1.1613, and 1.3226. Thus, the
expected funds rate is 0.9327 (= 0.6774 * 0.11439026 + 0.8387 *
0.18845445 + 1 * 0.69715529 + 1.1613 * 0 + 1.3226 * 0).Finally, one might wonder whether a normal
likelihood function for the errors is appropriate.
The error terms, εi, cannot literally be normal, as
unbounded support for ε would be inconsistent
with the requirement that option prices must be
non-negative. To investigate whether the distri-
butional assumption for ε is important, we re-
estimated the example with a truncated normal
distribution that required option prices be non-
negative. The truncated distribution produced
comparable results with those from a normal
distribution. The estimated probabilities for the
five targets were 0.1057, 0.2059, 0.6884, 0, and 0,
respectively. The largest change in a probability
estimate from the normal distribution was a very
modest 1.7 percentage points.
USING OPTIONS TO GAUGE
MARKET UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
FUTURE FEDERAL FUNDS 
TARGETS
Even when the strategy driving monetary
policy decisions is well understood and when
the central bank seeks to operate in a transparent
manner, market expectations can change when
the policy strategy changes or when new infor-
mation about economic conditions arrives. This
section uses daily PDFs to explore the evolving
uncertainty among market participants about
future monetary policy actions.
August 2003: FOMC Pre-Commits to
Monetary Policy Accommodation for a
“Considerable Period”
By the fall of 2002, U.S. inflation was consis-
tent with price stability as commonly understood
today (i.e., inflation was of little consequence in
making economic decisions). In fact, inflation had
declined so much that the Federal Reserve began
to consider further declines to be unwelcome
because they might lead to deflation.
Financial analysts may have misinterpreted
statements by Federal Reserve officials in the fall
of 2002 and the spring of 2003 to imply that there
would be a prolonged period of lower short-term
rates and/or the purchase of long-term bonds by
the Fed in order to implement “easier” monetary
policy (Neely, 2004). Moreover, the FOMC state-
ment of May 6, 2003, was widely misinterpreted
to confirm such incorrect beliefs.5 Thus, by early
June 2003, bond markets had come to expect lower
interest rates for a longer period than may have
been warranted by the state of the economy. Neely
(2003) provides some evidence to suggest that
these developments were related to expectations
of lower real growth, rather than lower inflation.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows that, in the
days prior to the June 25, 2003, FOMC meeting,
investors perceived a 50 to 70 percent chance that
the target rate would be lowered from 1.25 percent
to 0.75 percent. This is indicated by the thick,
light-blue line in the top panel of the figure, which
plots the daily implied probability estimates
associated with each possible target rate.
The FOMC, in fact, decided to cut the target
rate only from 1.25 percent to 1.00 percent. This
action not only resolved the near-term uncertainty
investors faced, but also caused them to revise
their expectations for future monetary policy. The
second panel of Figure 3 shows that expectations
during July of further rate cuts at the August meet-
ing rapidly declined. The two lines showing the
probabilities assigned by investors to a 0.75 per-
cent target and to a 0.50 percent target after the
August meeting converged toward zero as July
passed. By late July, markets were fairly certain
that the FOMC would choose a 1 percent target
at the August meeting.
The third panel of Figure 3 shows the analo-
gous probabilities of various target outcomes for
the December 2003 meeting, as assessed each
day from June onward. This panel shows that by
late July or early August, markets had started to
assign positive probabilities to the possibility of
an increase to 1.25 or 1.50 percent at the December
meeting.
To reassure markets that the target rate would
not be raised in the near future, the FOMC issued
a statement after the August 12, 2003, meeting
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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Option-Implied Probabilities of Federal Funds Target Rates To Be Chosen at the June, August,
and December 2003 Meetingsthat contained the first commitment by the FOMC
that the current low target rate would persist:
“The Committee judges that, on balance, the risk
of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to
be the predominant concern for the foreseeable
future. In these circumstances, the Committee
believes that policy accommodation can be main-
tained for a considerable period.”6 This language
was repeated in the September 16, 2003, FOMC
statement. The bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates
that, in the 3 months after August 12, market
expectations coalesced on the idea that a 1 percent
target would be the outcome of the December
meeting. The FOMC announcements successfully
anchored market expectations on a 1 percent funds
target rate for at least the next 4 months.
May 2004: FOMC Signals Its First Rate
Increase in Four Years
The Federal Reserve never defined what a
“considerable period” was, but no one doubted
that the FOMC’s target rate would be raised even-
tually. From Figure 4 it appears that speculation
about impending rate increases began in earnest
in March 2004 and that expectations about the
timing and magnitude of rate increases evolved
considerably during the course of the year.
Figure 4 displays a term structure of expected
target rates extracted from 1-, 3-, 6- and 9-month-
ahead federal funds futures contracts on each
trading day during 2004. The fixed calendar-
month nature of federal funds futures contracts
means that the “roll forward” day occurs on the
first trading day of each month. For example, on
May 28, 2004, the expected average funds rate for
“next month” referred to the average for June 2004
and was 1.02 percent.7 The next business day was
June 1, when the May contract was settled and
“next month” became July 2004. The thin line
representing the 1-month-ahead expected federal
funds rate shows a jump to 1.23 percent on June 1,
implying that market expectations for a 25-basis-
point increase by “next month”—effectively, by
the end of June—was considered very likely.
Figure 4 allows us to pinpoint evolving market
expectations about the timing of the first target
increase in four years. The line representing 9-
month-ahead expectations shows that, during
January and February 2004, market expectations
were for a funds target in the 1.25 to 1.50 percent
range during October and November 2004. But
when would these increases occur? The line rep-
resenting 3-month-ahead expectations jumped
abruptly on May 3, 2004, from 1.11 percent to 1.27
percent. This coincided with the roll-forward
from July to August 2004 of the 3-month-ahead
contract. The jump implies that market expecta-
tions at that time (May 3) were tilted toward an
initial increase in the funds target at the August
10 meeting, rather than at the June 29-30 meet-
ing. Only later during May 2004 did expectations
shift toward an initial increase at the June meet-
ing, as described above in the context of the 1-
month-ahead contract.
The distance between the 1-, 3-, 6- and 9-
month-ahead implied yields in the figure illus-
trates the expected pace of funds target increases
at any given point in time. On June 14, 2004, for
example, the market expected the funds target
to average 1.33 percent during July 2004 (next
month), 1.85 percent during September 2004 (3
months ahead), 2.44 percent during December
2004 (6 months ahead), and 2.95 percent during
March 2005 (9 months ahead). In the event, the
actual average effective funds rates during those
months were 1.26, 1.61, 2.16, and 2.63 percent,
respectively.
Given the difficulty of separating the timing
from the magnitude of future rate increases from
federal funds futures alone, it is helpful to examine
risk-neutral PDFs derived from federal funds
futures options. The top panel of Figure 5 displays
the evolving probabilities attached to various pos-
sible rate targets to be chosen at the June 2004
FOMC meeting. While Figure 4 demonstrates that
market expectations of a sequence of future rate
increases emerged after the May 4, 2004, FOMC
meeting, the top panel of Figure 5 shows that, in
early summer of 2004, market participants became
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6 Press release issued by the Federal Reserve’s FOMC, August 12,
2003; www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2003/
20030812/.
7 The average effective rate can deviate slightly from the FOMC’s
target rate because of daily fluctuations in actual reserve-market
conditions.convinced that the rate increases were to start with
the June FOMC meeting. The bottom panel of
Figure 5 shows that the FOMC’s June 30 decision
to raise the funds target from 1.00 percent to
1.25 percent prompted agents to expect further
increases at the August meeting.
June 2004: FOMC Pre-Commits to
Increasing Its Target Rate at a
“Measured Pace”
Apparently wary of disrupting financial mar-
kets with rapid rate increases, the FOMC signaled
after its June 30, 2004, meeting that it intended
to raise its target rate gradually over time: “With
underlying inflation still expected to be relatively
low, the Committee believes that policy accom-
modation can be removed at a pace that is likely
to be measured. Nonetheless, the Committee will
respond to changes in economic prospects as
needed to fulfill its obligation to maintain price
stability.”8 Figure 4 shows that, after the FOMC’s
June 30 statement, with the target rate at 1.25
percent, expectations of longer-term increases
moderated and stabilized. That is, the level and
volatility of the 3-, 6-, and 9-month-ahead implied
rates declined and stabilized after June 30. This
suggests that the “measured pace” language was
well-understood by market participants.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 confirms this
view by showing probabilities of targets to be
chosen at the August 2004 FOMC meeting. Prior
to the June 2004 FOMC meeting there were sub-
stantial expectations of a 50- or even 75-basis-
point increase, to 1.75 or 2.0 percent at the August
meeting. But after the statement at the June FOMC
meeting, the market gradually became convinced
that the increase was going to be in increments
of 25 basis points, to 1.5 percent at the August
2004 meeting.
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Federal Funds Futures–Implied Yields from Contracts Traded in 2004
NOTE: The figure shows the average federal funds rates implied by the 1-, 3-, 6-, and 9-month-ahead federal funds rate futures con-
tracts for 2004.
8 Press release issued by the Federal Reserve’s FOMC, June 30, 2004;
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/
20040630/default.htm.Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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Option-Implied Probabilities of Federal Funds Target Rates To Be Chosen at the June and
August 2004 FOMC MeetingAugust/September 2005: Gulf Coast
Hurricanes Create Uncertainty About
the FOMC’s Likely Rate Increases
The devastation along the Gulf Coast caused
by hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and
September 2005 substantially revised market
expectations about monetary policy actions.
Figure 6 displays the federal funds futures–implied
target rates derived from 1-, 3-, and 6-month-ahead
futures contracts traded in 2005. The impact of the
hurricanes, especially Katrina, is clearly visible
about September 1, 2005. Fearing that Katrina
might significantly slow the U.S. economy, market
participants revised down their expectations of
3- and 6-month-ahead target rates.
One also can examine the PDFs from option
prices before and after Katrina’s second landfall
(near New Orleans, after traversing the southern
tip of Florida) on August 29 to infer the evolution
of expectations for the November 1, 2005, FOMC
meeting over this turbulent period. The upper left
panel of Figure 7 shows that, on August 23—when
the funds target was 3.5 percent—the markets
expected a greater-than-80 percent chance of a
4.0 point target rate at the November 1 meeting,
with some modest chance of a 3.75 or 4.25 percent
target. On September 1, three days after Katrina
made second landfall, market expectations of
the funds target on November 1 had declined
and dispersed significantly (top right subpanel).
The mean futures rate was 3.74 percent, and the
chances of a funds target of 3.5, 3.75, or 4.0 per-
cent were approximately 38, 31, and 28 percent,
respectively. In other words, the markets assessed
the probability that the target at the November
meeting would be 4.0 percent or greater declined
from about 90 percent to about 30 percent.
By September 8, panic had subsided a bit;
the bottom-left subpanel shows that the implied
probabilities of 3.75 and 4.0 percent targets were
48 percent and 42 percent, respectively (bottom-
left subpanel). Finally, by September 30—after a
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely












Average Effective Federal Funds Rate
Figure 6
Federal Funds Futures–Implied Yields from Contracts Traded in 2005
NOTE: The figure shows the average federal funds rates implied by the 1-, 3-, 6-, and 9-month-ahead federal funds rate futures con-
tracts for 2005.25-basis-point target increase to 3.75 percent at the
September 20 FOMC meeting—the PDF showed
that market expectations had returned to approxi-
mately the pre-Katrina level, with a more-than-90
percent chance of a 4.0 target at the November
meeting (bottom-right subpanel).
Figure 8 shows another way of looking at the
same information; it plots the probabilities of
various outcomes at the November meeting over
time. Four days after Katrina made landfall, the
possibility that the Fed would increase the funds
rate all the way to 4.0 percent by November 1
declined significantly, from 85 percent to 25 per-
cent. At the same time, the possibility that the
FOMC would not change the funds target at all
increased to almost 30 percent for a day.
April 27, 2006: Chairman Bernanke
Testifies Before the Joint Economic
Committee
The weeks prior to the May 10, 2006, FOMC
meeting were unusually active ones in the federal
funds futures and options markets. Market expec-
tations were quite sensitive to incoming economic
data and statements. For example, the top panel
of Figure 9 shows that strong reports on housing
and durable goods on April 25 and 26 raised the
expected federal funds rate from 5.11 percent to
5.16 percent and the lower panel shows that the
implied probability of a 5.25 percent target rate
after the June FOMC meeting rose from under 40
percent to about 60 percent.
Emmons, Lakdawala, Neely
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Option-Derived Probability Density Functions (PDF) Surrounding Hurricane Katrina
NOTE: The figure shows option-implied probability density functions around the time of Hurricane Katrina, which made second landfall
on August 29, 2005. The vertical bars denote the rate implied by the federal funds futures contract price.On April 27, Chairman Bernanke (2006)
spoke before the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress on the outlook for the U.S. economy.
The Chairman was broadly optimistic about the
state of the U.S. economy, describing the prospects
for maintaining solid growth as “good” and the
outlook for inflation as “reasonably favorable.”
The Chairman went on to note that the FOMC
had increased the federal funds rate by 25 basis
points at each of its previous 15 meetings and
that the current federal funds target was 4.75
percent. The Chairman cautioned that
[P]olicy will respond to arriving information
that affects the Committee’s assessment of the
medium-term risks to its objectives of price
stability and maximum sustainable employ-
ment…[A]t some point in the future the
Committee may decide to take no action at one
or more meetings in the interest of allowing
more time to receive information relevant to
the outlook. Of course, a decision to take no
action at a particular meeting does not preclude
actions at subsequent meetings, and the
Committee will not hesitate to act when it
determines that doing so is needed to foster
the achievement of the Federal Reserve’s
mandated objectives.
Economists might interpret such a comment
as a judicious statement of the obvious: The
FOMC’s policy decisions will respond to news
and changing economic conditions. It was widely
reported that financial markets interpreted the
statement to mean that a pause in the interest rate
increases was imminent. Equity markets rallied;
the S&P 500 finished up over 4 points on April 27.
The top panel of Figure 9 shows that the expected
federal funds target for the May FOMC meeting fell
from 5.16 percent to 5.07 percent between April 26
and April 28 in response to the Chairman’s testi-
mony. The lower panel shows that this was gener-
ated by a shift in the probability of a 5.25 percent
target from 60 percent to 23 percent and a similar
rise in the probability of a 5.0 percent target.
SUMMARY
This article uses the method of Carlson, Craig,
and Melick (2005) to extract an implied risk-
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Option-Implied Probabilities of Federal Funds Target Rates To Be Chosen at the November 2005
FOMC MeetingEmmons, Lakdawala, Neely

































































































Expected Federal Funds Targets and Option-Implied Probabilities of Federal Funds Target Rates
To Be Chosen at the May 2006 FOMC Meeting
NOTE: FF, Federal funds; JEC, Joint Economic Committee.neutral probability density function over possible
future federal funds target rates from daily option
prices. Option-based forecasts are most useful
when more than two federal funds target outcomes
are plausible at an upcoming FOMC meeting. If
only one or two meeting outcomes are plausible,
a futures-based forecast is simpler and more appro-
priate.
We assess evolving market uncertainty about
Federal Reserve monetary policy actions in a
variety of recent events and episodes, including
(i) a commitment by the FOMC to maintain mon-
etary policy accommodation for a “considerable
period”; (ii) a signal by the FOMC that the first
target-rate increase in four years was forthcoming;
(iii) a commitment by the FOMC to raise the target
rate over time at a “measured pace”; (iv) the
devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina; and
(v) April 2006 testimony by Chairman Bernanke
before the Joint Economic Committee. These
episodes illustrate how federal funds futures
options can be used to supplement the informa-
tion derived from federal funds futures and other
sources of market expectations about Federal
Reserve monetary policy actions.
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